Will the AFPAK strategic review not lead to a new strategy?
Dear readers: Thank you for some fantastic comments on the last blog. It clearly provoked a lot of thoughts from readers who may disagree on the threat, but are equally impassioned about protecting U.S. interests during this difficult economic period. So many thanks for sharing your thoughts.
In the days ahead, we expect the administration to release its strategic review for Afghanistan/Pakistan, which many expect will guide the way ahead in that critical war. It’s being put together by a coterie of military and academic experts on the matter, and many who follow this issue have been anticipating its release for weeks.
But as we get closer, it appears that the report is far less prescriptive than expected. At least that is what I am hearing in quiet murmurs around the Pentagon. It’s not clear this report will spell out new strategy; instead I hear it will clarify what the U.S. objectives really are.
It has me wondering: Is strategic review an accurate way to describe this critical report?
On Charlie Rose last week, Adm. Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, talked about the strategic review and described it this way: “Broadly, it addresses, as it needs to address, the concerns that many of us have expressed over a long period of time. A safe haven in Pakistan. Making sure that Afghanistan doesn`t provide a capability in the long run or an environment in which al Qaeda could return or the Taliban could return. To provide for the stability in that country, to put the country in a position to, in fact, develop its own armed forces, to provide for its own security would be another example, and to get the economy going and get governance moving in the right direction at all levels in Afghanistan -- national, provincial, as well as the district level. Those are all key points, although I think the strategy will be more comprehensive than just covering those things.”
Did the chairman describe a strategy or a goal, an end state? Do we already know the strategy– send more troops in the south and decrease U.S. support for Hamid Karzai and an Afghanistan led by a strong central government for a more bottom-up approach? Probably not, since sending more troops is a tactic, not a strategy.
So I ask you dear readers, what makes an idea a strategy? And what must the report say to truly be a strategy for the way ahead in Afghanistan?
There should be only one strategy, one focus, one goal. That is victory. History proves over and over again that half way measures and "limited warfare" don't resolve the problems that led to conflict. In this case Bush was correct when he stated that anyone who harbors terrorist is our enemy but he did not follow through and disable Iran and Syria, nor did he force the Saudis to surrender the Wahibis'. He did not enter the Pakistani mountains or better yet send the B-52s in to reduce them to rubble. Eveyone who says we cannot win the war on terror is lying. Period. They just don't have the balls to win. Unfortunately, in the long run that will equal surrender and the slow death of Western Civilization as witnessed by the Islamic population takeovers of Europe and the Once Great Britain. Goodbye freedom and rule of law, hello Sharia Law. But don't panic, it's nothing to lose your head over. Better to die nobly than lower youself to the level of the enemy who has sworn to kill you and your children.
Posted by: worddust | March 23, 2009 at 10:13 AM
Terrorist groups act based on operational capacity and motivation. The Bush Administration used a military-only strategy re: the GWOT and ignored motivation - not the motivation of terrorists but the motivation of the people in terms of what they choose as their future. What is needed fundamentally for each person is food and water, shelter, security and transportation. People will not be motivated to move forward without any one of these fundamental needs. Afghanis have to see this for themselves and with the help of their government and fellow Afghanis. Our role could be simply to find ways to 'help them to help themselves'. In other words, the US becomes world's most effective peacebuilder as well a leading tactician re: the GWOT. And, make no mistake about it, the US is not that far from away from food and water, shelter, security and transportation for its own people.
Posted by: Philip Henika | March 18, 2009 at 08:41 PM
OED:
2. a. The art of a commander-in-chief; the art of projecting and directing the larger military movements and operations of a campaign.
Usually distinguished from tactics, which is the art of handling forces in battle or in the immediate presence of the enemy.
Obama has made a strategic decision to send more troops. That is one strategic step.
Saying "The cake must be moist, the cake must be sweet, the cake must be soft," these are descriptive of goals, and accomplish nothing. "Break the egg sharply on the edge of the bowl; knead the butter with your bare hands at or near 68 degrees," these are tactical statements which accomplish only details, unanchored to any outcome. "Gather ingredients, prepare them appropriately and carefully, then serve after dinner," is a strategy, which is inactionable without tactical expertise.
Success requires strategy, tactics, and competent execution, and if you fail one, you fail all. Which is why Afghanistan will revert to the 9/11 mass murderers before the US remembers the object of war is to inflict such suffering on the enemy that any alternative is more attractive than further fighting, itself a statement which will (100% money-back guarantee) NOT be in Obam's plan.
Question O-thority.
Posted by: peterspal | March 17, 2009 at 04:57 PM
I understand Mullen to be talking about strategic goals, some of which (develop economy, government, armed forces) are not clearly necessary to the others (stability, excluding the Taliban). The overall strategic goal is to prevent terrorist attacks by denying them safe havens. While a stable, popular government with effective police/ military power (in Afghanistan or anywhere else) may approach this goal, such a result cannot be secured with any certainty.
The costs in Afghanistan seem prohibitively high, given that the massive Western effort required will be seen as foreign intervention.
Posted by: johnieb | March 17, 2009 at 03:02 PM
"Probably not, since sending more troops is a tactic, not a strategy."
Fighting a counter-insugrent campagin is a tactic, moving more men and or materials into theater is a strategy.
Why is the counter-insurgent campagin and occupation of Afghanistan by US/NATO force's considered to be a "critical war"? Critical to what? And or to whom?
How does the tribal state of Afghanistan affect the US/NATO in strategic terms?
With the exception of natural gas/oil pipelines and the cultivation of opium of course.
Or are you just parroting the offical "talking points" whispered ever so seductively by anonymous high level officals into the ears of unquestioning stenographers in the hallowed halls of the United States Department of War?
Posted by: Persona non grata | March 16, 2009 at 10:50 PM
Nancy-
I think the textbook answer is that a strategy has a goal aimed for, and step(s) or key components necessary to achieving it.
I'm expecting the AFPAC review will be like the 30 second interviews with football coaches before the game. No detail, broad strokes ("hold their running game to a minimum", etc), nothing really given away. It's still strategy, but so broad that it doesn't have specific details to take advantage of.
Posted by: The Flying Economist | March 16, 2009 at 07:44 PM