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November 10, 2008

The DoD's NYT bestseller

Three weeks ago, the Defense Department put out its latest field manual 3-07, which outlined how the military should go about carrying out stability operations. Now I know that sounds drier than toast but it is an important manual. In the previous manual, 3-0, the military acknowledged that stability operations – which include things like nation building – is as important as traditional defense operations. That is, the U.S. military must not only train to fight other major military powers but learn how to rebuild communities, too. FM 3-07 spells out how the military should go about doing that.

It’s been a controversial publication because it really is the military official declaration that it will do things differently. The U.S. military cannot no longer only prepare to fight major wars, it says. And that causes much consternation for some. After all, stability operations are a lot more complicated than traditional wars. Traditional wars are linear. There is a battlefield, a line and eventually a declaration of victory. But stability operations are a lot more nebulous. They don’t just require the best fighting force, but street-savvy soldiers, political reconciliation and so on. And there is no clear line of success. For example, Veterans Day (which the United States recognizes tomorrow) began as a celebration of the end of World War I, at the 11th hour of the 11th day of the 11th month 1918. That is, there was a very clear end in that traditional fight. Such declarations are not as clear in this war. When did Iraq’s Anbar province become a rebuilt area? It all depends on who you ask.

Anyway, I learned today that more than 250,000 people have downloaded the manual in three weeks. Those are New York Times bestselling numbers. And it says something about how much people are looking at this manual. Some authors toil for years for such numbers. So the military is considering publishing the manual and selling it in bookstores, just as it did for 3-0. If you want to check it out, click here.

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Comments

Nancy Youssef

Hi Philip: Thanks for pointing out that report. Very interesting indeed.

Philip Henika

Nancy -

An interesting article was just published at CTC Sentinel v. 1 (12): pg 22-23, November 2008, "Shi'a Leaders Disagree on Integration of Sons of Iraq into Army" by Reider Visser

Philip

Philip Henika

LTC Steve Leonard:

I think I have exhausted my questions and I will certainly read FM 3-07 with heightened curiosity.

This discussion reminds of something Albert Einstein said re: technology and human understanding: "It has become appallingly obvious that our technology has exceeded our humanity."

You posit the question of global peacebuilding and national security for which there is not an answer yet but for which there is, at the very least, an effort to advance human understanding and 'to help people help themselves' which is a phrase that I have heard often in the course of these discussions.

Thanks again,

My Best,

Philip

LTC Steve Leonard

Philip – I wish everyone asked the same tough questions; that makes this debate so much richer and of such greater significance. The socio-political factors involved in the agriculture equation of Afghanistan alone make for great discussion. No single action in the Afghan agro-domain can occur without some sort of reaction (often unanticipated) in another area of that system. Can you alter the crop base without affecting the local economy? If you do, then what actions are required to allay effects in other elicit areas? Licit areas? What are the long term effects of those actions? Do those require a modification of the surrounding societal institutions?
The importance of transparency, messaging, and consistency of words and deeds is equally important to this debate. Words mean little without consistency of action . . . think we’ve stirred a debate here that extends beyond that, though. Is the traditional notion of national security evolving? Did FM 3-07 open a debate on the future meaning of national security in a rapidly changing world? That wasn’t our intent, but many are now asking the question . . . would such a “global peacebuilding” effort redefine how we as a nation approach issues of national security?

Philip Henika

Nancy, LTG William Caldwell IV
and LTC Steve Leonard:

This is indeed a remarkable discussion and I thank you all for listening.

The peacebuilding models that I have observed have considered, as you have pointed out, the mutiple factors which effect people's health and prosperity. The Carter Center, in Uganda and Sudan helped with family reunification but also with the eradication of guinea worm with water filters and improved farming practices. Efforts in the Philippines were referred to by the Philippine military, as I recall, as an "arms to farms" initiative. On the competitive side of this equation is the apparent take over of poppy farming by the Taliban/AQ in Afghanistan. How do we prevent that activity when the opportunity presents itself? Does the Afghanistan government implement a farm registry in which the government contacts all farmers? Can poppies be converted to a medicinal crop via genetic engineering? More questions arise re: innovation e.g. if infrastructure is restored will it be energy-efficient? And, finally, if you look at Warren Strobel's post above on Al Qaeda and IT, it is suggested there that AQ is losing its competitive IT edge i.e. people are tuning into 'us' as well as AQ. And, we do not have to necessarily expand the "war of words" but we have the choice to expand a global peacebuilding initiative. If President elect Obama talks about the FM 3-07 efforts via You-Tube then don't people have a new choice as who and what to listen to?

Nancy Youssef

Philip: What a wonderful discussion your questions have sparked. After your last post, I called LTC Leonard -- who wrote 3-07-- to get his opinion on your question. We didn't get a chance to talk but lo and behold both he and LTG Caldwell posted responses. What I love most about the posts is that the reflect the kind of debates happening right now in the halls of the Pentagon.

Thank Gen. Caldwell and LTC Leonard for your thoughtful posts. They explained the issues far better than I ever could. And they show that your postings, dear readers, are reaching the military's decision makers. So keep writing, I say.

LTC Steve Leonard

Philip –
Thanks for your ongoing comments! They really help to get at the heart of this debate!
When developing this manual, the intent of the writing team was to cast as wide a net as possible since - with the possible exception of the security sector - the true experts typically reside outside the military. We sought out the time-tested practitioners within the development and humanitarian communities, the policy specialists within our government, and the critical thinkers focusing on workable solutions to what is essentially a fundamentally human problem. Those experts brought with them every imaginable model, system, framework, and guidebook in existence or in development. Our task was to meld all of that knowledge – what represented years of practical experience and theory – into 200 pages of actionable doctrine . . . something focused enough to have an immediate impact, yet knowing that there would still be some issues left to stir debate and discussion. Ultimately, what you see before you is the nexus of that experience and theory – derived from models such as the one you cite. The validation of the doctrine comes from the time-proven application of the principles upon which the manual is founded, the expertise drawn from a wide community of practitioners, both civilian and military.
Much of the text of the manual contends with the human condition – in the end, no intervention is complete unless it addresses the human dimension of conflict. That said, we didn’t specifically focus the book on any specific aspect of terrorism. Is countermotivation a valid counterterrorism measure? By itself, no; in concert with other measures that provide for the enduring social well-being of the individual and the community, yes. Whatever approach you choose has to provide lasting solutions that ensures lasting social cohesion.

Philip Henika

LTG William Caldwell IV

Thank you for comments.

As I pointed out above, peacebuilding efforts, which have the same goal for lasting peace that you allude to here, proceed with a consideration for the health and prosperity of the people in the region secured from terrorism. The modus operandi of the Carter Center in foreign countries is an application of an innovative peacebuilding model and, thus, has the military looked at other peacebuiding models for validation of the precedents and practices of FM 3-07? Another effort to examine might be the precedents and practices in SE Asia
as derived from ASEAN Counterterrorism Conferences. Provision of a person's future without pressure from terrorist group recruitment has been referred to as countermotivation. Do you agree that countermotivation is a valid counterterrorism measure?

LTG William Caldwell IV

FM 3-07 represents a serious Army effort to codify hard-won lessons of the last 25 years. Interventions in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans all embodied sizeable elements of stability operations. Current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have taught our Army that winning the initial kinetic fight is necessary, but not sufficient to sustain lasting peace. Major combat operations merely set the stage for follow on operations. The new stability operations doctrine provides a roadmap that moves us towards an enduring peace.

The “Comprehensive Approach” inherent in this doctrine seeks to integrate the cooperative efforts of diverse government departments and agencies, as well as the efforts of our allies and partners, including private sector entities. Four basic tenets underlie the Comprehensive Approach: Accommodation, understanding, cooperation and purpose-based goals. These tenets work to achieve unity of effort among the diverse organizations conducting stability operations. The long-term intent is to position the United States to achieve stability and peace in a complex, ever changing international environment.

One of the obstacles to successful stability operations in the past has been the inability to communicate effectively among organizations that often speak different languages, both figuratively and literally. As antidote, FM 3-07 provides a lexicon of terms. Included are both the U.S. Agency for International Development’s principles for reconstruction and development and the guidelines for interacting with nongovernmental humanitarian agencies. The manual also details the governing principles for the Interagency Management System, in addition to offering an overview of the interagency conflict assessment framework.

Experience teaches us that weak and failing states often provide terrorist safe havens, destabilize neighboring states and encourage international crime. This stability operations doctrine is an important tool for conflict transformation—a process that reduces the motivations and means for conflict while simultaneously developing peaceful alternatives for coping with political and socioeconomic change.

Philip Henika

Nancy -

Thank you for your reply.

Let me ask you a question as well. Do you agree that the physical and mental health of e.g. the Iraqi people is rarely if ever mentioned in the assessment of the costs of American military intervention? Some of the peacebuilding models that I have studied address, as a priority, such issues as (1) the rehabilitation of child soldiers or wannabe terrorists and (2) the reunification of families seperated by civil war, emigration or insurgency recruitment. In other words, peacebuilding, as you can imagine, has its precedents, priorities, and methods so you wonder what role America can play?

Philip

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ABOUT THIS BLOG

"Nukes & Spooks" is written by McClatchy correspondents Jonathan S. Landay (national security and intelligence), Warren P. Strobel (foreign affairs and the State Department), and Nancy Youssef (Pentagon).

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