While the questions are still swirling around the assassination of Hezbollah leader Imad Mughniyeh (America's intelligence chief, Mike McConnell, suggested over the weekend that Hezbollah or Syria might have been behind the attack, while The Sunday Times in London ran a questionable story with the unsupported headline "Israel kills terror chief with headrest bomb."), there is no question that Israel did assassinate another major Hezbollah figure 16 years ago.
On Feb. 16, 1992, Israel staged an air strike in southern Lebanon that killed Hezbollah leader Sheik Abbas Musawi, his wife and their young daughter.
The air strike was apparently the first time Israel used Apache helicopters for a targeted assassination.
As Israeli journalist Ronen Bergmen noted in a piece over the weekend, that strike led to a five-day volley of Hezbollah rocket fire from southern Lebanon, the assassination of Israel's security chief at its embassy in Turkey and a deadly attack on Israel's embassy in Argentina.
The 1992 attack also led to the rise of Hassan Nasrallah.
By coincidence, Israel's Ma'ariv newspaper ran a story over the weekend with interviews with the pilots who took part in the 1992 assassination. Below are selections translated by McClatchy.
"We identified the convoy," the lead pilot, identified as A., told the paper. "There were several vehicles: a very nice looking black Mercedes, and a Land Rover carrying the guards. You could immediately see that it was (the convoy) of an important person. The vehicles were traveling in a disciplined fashion at a high speed. We identified the target vehicle and began to track it. During the journey it changed place (in the convoy) a number of times. Just to be sure, they told us to destroy all the vehicles in the convoy. We fired the first missile from a range of 5 kilometers (three miles). A good range. It hit the correct vehicle, Musawi's vehicle. The vehicle was blown to bits. I'm sure he didn't know what was happening, he didn't see the missile coming, he didn't hear the missile explode. The first missile killed him."
"You know, at first, few took this mission seriously," said A. "To fly with combat helicopters to a specific place and find a convoy of similar looking cars and identify the correct car and also to destroy it? No, such a mission was thought of as a joke, even by senior officers in the Air Force... But more importantly it was this mission - considered a success in purely military terms - that brought bad news to the citizens of Israel: with the death of Abbas Musawi the career of his successor, Hassan Nasrallah, began."
The article actually describes the decision to kill Musawi as haphazard.
It apparently started with an idea to kidnap Musawi as a bargaining chip. But he was too well guarded for that, so they decided to simply kill him.
There were reportedly those who thought it wasn't worth the cost, but the concerns were overruled by Israel's intelligence director, then-Chief-of-Staff Ehud Barak (now Israel's Labor Party leader) and Defense Minster Moshe Arens.
The head of the flight group, Moshe, told Ma'ariv that he had no regrets about the operation.
"Hezbollah people, even the senior among them, need to be killed," Moshe told the paper. "I know that sounds inhumane, not nice, and also personally it's not a nice feeling. But this is a war, and in war you kill your enemy."
"No one had ever fired at a car from an Apache," A. told the paper. "You need to connect to the vehicle, the intelligence people have to make sure who is in the vehicle. The pilots have to catch the vehicle at a high speed, between houses and not hit bystanders. Today these things seem simple, but back then we had to develop them (and) it was very complicated."
The Intelligence behind the attack was relatively simple, the paper reported.
Musawi was scheduled to speak in memory of a Hezbollah leader who had been assassinated and when he left the town a special forces group marked the car (though the paper doesn't say how they did this) that Musawi rode in.
After the attack other pilots at the base rushed to congratulate their colleagues and review films of the attack. After a couple days they were ordered to stop out of concern for the safety of the pilots.
"After the attack in Buenos Ares we realized it was indirectly connected to us. We had informal discussions about this and I think about it to this day," said one of the pilots. "I still believe this was a legitimate operation and correct operationally."